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COMMENTARY
JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY
THROUGH THE INITIAL SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE: THE METHOD
Jaime Pieras, Jr. *
Before I joined the bench, I practiced law for about thirty years, mainly in
the area of civil litigation. During my years in practice, I found that most of
the cases I handled were settled before trial. My experience is consonant
with the statistics showing that only six percent of the civil cases filed in
federal court are actually tried.' The practice of a trial lawyer clearly in-
volves much more than the actual trial of cases in court; it is an exercise in
negotiation of settlement agreements.
I believe the officers of the court, both judges and lawyers, can help the
system by developing expertise in the art of pretrial procedure. Pretrial pro-
cedure properly conducted can serve to uncover those cases that should be
settled rather than tried, and can do so expeditiously and accurately. In
reality, there are three participants in every case: the plaintiff, the defendant,
and the court. All of them have their particular interest. The plaintiff's and
defendant's interests are of an economic nature; the court's interest is in the
administration of justice in accordance with the law and in the speedy reso-
lution of disputes. Speedy resolution translates into economy of time, effort,
and money, and consequently the reduction of costs to all participants. Our
present system of subsidized courts, in which the fees paid by the litigants do
* B.A. 1945, The Catholic University of America; J.D. 1948, Georgetown University.
Judge, United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. I conducted the experi-
ment recounted here with the collaboration of my law clerks, Janelle M. Diller, Jose R.
Gaztambide, and Guillermo Pesant, all excellent scholars.
1. See A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 9 (Jan. 20, 1984) (revision of remarks at a Federal Judicial Center work-
shop). Arthur Miller states that more than 90% of all federal civil cases are settled or are
disposed prior to trial. Id. In an accounting for fiscal year 1975-76, the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts reported that 92% of the terminations of civil cases in federal
courts occurred before trial. Hon. F.B. Lacey, The Judge's Role in the Settlement of Civil
Suits 5 (Sept. 26, 1977) (address at a seminar for newly appointed judges sponsored by the
Federal Judicial Center).
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not cover the cost of the service provided to them, produces, as one com-
mentator put it, "a cheap ride" for those who file frivolous suits.2 By adopt-
ing a comprehensive pretrial procedure, the court can eliminate these cases,
reduce the total number of cases on its docket, and enhance the quality of its
decisionmaking.3
To appreciate the importance of a proper pretrial method, one must first
understand that the trial court, in my case the United States District Court
for the District of Puerto Rico, is the first line of fire on the battlefield of the
judicial system. Its main thrust is to define and resolve controversies speed-
ily, economically, and fairly. It is not primarily a place dedicated to creating
great literary jewels. Its purpose, when achieved, may be important in shap-
ing communal thought, but it is essentially and necessarily a place for the
resolution of disputes through settlement.
By asserting its role and interest early in the pretrial stages of the case,
and by varying the degree of its involvement according to the nature of the
case, the court can reduce the cost of litigation to the public and achieve the
fair and speedy administration of justice.4 Those who oppose a more active
judicial role in litigation argue that the goals of fairness and speed in judicial
case management are conflicting.5 It is my experience that these goals not
only fail to conflict, but indeed complement each other in achieving the ends
of justice for all.
The rules of civil procedure-both state and federal-are directed essen-
tially to preparing for trial through the discovery process.6 At the time of
filing the pleadings, the lawyers know the facts by hearsay through what the
client or some representative of the client told them or through statements
gathered by investigators. Sometimes the information is the product of mere
speculation. There is nothing wrong with this. The question is how the law-
2. Settling Out of Court, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1985, at 22, col. 2.
3. For example, on the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico in
September 1985, my caseload totalled 306 cases as compared with an average caseload of 423
cases for the same month.
4. A recent American Bar Association poll revealed that fully 85% of the attorneys
polled believed involvement by federal judges in settlement discussions is likely to improve
significantly the probability of settlement. See Brazil, What Do Lawyers Expect from Judges?,
2 TRIAL, Sept. 1985, at 69, 71. The key to successful judicial involvement, according to those
polled, is a judge who carefully and logically expresses an informed evaluation of the case in
conference with the parties. Id. at 69. Such an informed point of view only comes through
learning the facts of the case from the lawyers in the early stages of the case.
5. See, e.g., Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). Professor Resnik
argues that "case processing is no longer ... a means to an end; it [has] become the desired
goal." Id. at 431. Although I acknowledge the pitfall of over-emphasizing the number of
cases on one's docket, I cannot agree with Resnik that relying on judges to achieve the goal of
speedier dispute resolution jeopardizes the quality of our judicial system.
6. See infra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
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yers are to learn the facts. Should they spend thousands of dollars and sev-
eral years in discovery full of acrimonious arguments? The answer is clearly
no. Yet the rules of civil procedure allow and even encourage this by setting
forth elaborate rules of discovery and by paying little attention to stipula-
tions of fact and settlement.7 As a result, pretrial proceedings become ex-
tremely prolonged and costly.
I believe the rules of civil procedure should be revised to emphasize fact
finding early in the litigation and to assist the parties in becoming familiar
with their case. The facts of the case are generally more difficult to learn
than the law. Attorneys and judges are schooled in the law. We either know
the law or have the specialized technique to discover the law that applies.
However, the facts continually change from case to case. Only through a
knowledge of all the facts and evidence can the parties make an honest eval-
uation of the case.
The court can be instrumental in helping the parties acquire enough
knowledge of the facts to discuss settlement intelligently. To this end, I be-
gan to experiment in court, in conferences, and in the settlement room. In
particular, I directed the parties to learn the facts from their clients, their
independent investigation, and informal discovery. I shortened pretrial pro-
cedure by monitoring cases from the moment a complaint was filed, thereby
exercising the powers of the judge in the triad of plaintiff-defendant-court. I
found that the power of the judge, in his impartial role in the triad, can
provide much needed guidance with a lot of teeth. As a result, I developed a
pretrial method that I call the Initial Scheduling Conference (ISC).
A major new element that the ISC provides is that the parties and the
judge know the facts of the case better than at the time the case was filed and
earlier than standard discovery procedures would allow. If at this point the
parties do not settle, the case can proceed promptly to trial because all rele-
vant discovery has been gathered and the parties share full knowledge of
each other's facts and allegations. The ISC system actually enhances the
ability of judges to focus their attention to the appropriate degree and in the
proper areas. The system singles out and handles those cases that should
settle because no factual questions or novel legal issues are involved. Those
that remain are truly appropriate and ready for trial so that the judges's time
spent in trial is both justified and economized.
I. THE INITIAL SCHEDULING CONFERENCE METHOD
The ISC method revolves around holding a conference where the parties
and I meet together in chambers as soon as possible after the pleadings are
7. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 with FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a), (c), and 23(e).
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filed. The purpose of the conference is for all participants to become familiar
with the allegations of all parties, to stipulate to as many facts as possible,
and to identify which facts and legal issues remain in controversy. In addi-
tion, we use this conference to establish a schedule for discovery, a discovery
cut-off date, and dates for a final pretrial conference and trial. To function
properly, the method requires the coordination and participation of all the
court personnel and law clerks on my staff.
A. Step One: Monitoring the Pleadings
My first step is to prepare standing orders to be followed by the docket
and courtroom deputy clerks on my staff.' I instruct the docket clerk to
monitor the time after the filing of a complaint very closely. If an extension
of time to answer is requested, the clerk is to grant no more than a fifteen
day extension and to state that no further extensions will be granted. This is
the rule in all cases except those against the United States or its entities,
which are referred to me for decision about extension of time.9 I found that,
by insisting on the close monitoring of the time between the filing of the
complaint and the answer or other responsive pleading, the period for filing
initial pleadings is cut far shorter than in unmonitored cases and, indeed,
remains truer to the spirit of the rules of civil procedure.
Once a motion to dismiss or an answer is filed, the docket clerk sends the
case to my office to have a date assigned for an ISC. In most cases, my law
clerk will set a date for the ISC that allows the attorneys approximately
fifteen to twenty-five days advance notice. This procedure is followed even
when the defendant has not answered on time; such cases are likely to be
resolved through motions by the plaintiff for default judgment prior to the
date of the ISC. In cases with multiple defendants when not all have an-
swered, the law clerk sets a date for the ISC. This date falls shortly after the
time projected for the remaining answers to be due, that is, twenty days from
the date of service of summons."1 If the plaintiff has failed to serve the sum-
mons in a multiple-defendant case and other defendants have appeared, the
8. In the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, each judge is
assigned two deputy clerks for the office of the Clerk of Court: the docket deputy clerk and the
courtroom deputy clerk. The docket clerk processes all motions filed by attorneys and all
orders filed by the judge and retains a record of the same on a docket card for each case. The
courtroom deputy, among other duties, notifies the parties of court conferences, hearings, and
trials.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a) grants the United States or an officer or agency thereof 60 days
to answer after service of the complaint. In these cases, we therefore normally grant no more
than a 30 day extension of time to answer.




ISC is set as usual; it is to the plaintiff's advantage to serve summons on the
remaining parties as quickly as possible and then to request a continuance of
the ISC until appearance of the party or parties lacking.
I have also instructed my docket clerk to refer to my office any cases in
which the plaintiff fails to serve the summons within 120 days. Such cases
are then dismissed for lack of prosecution under Rule 41(b).1 '
At present, I use this monitoring system for all our civil cases except ad-
ministrative appeals, such as social security disability claims; miscellaneous
cases, such as motions to quash; and habeas corpus petitions. I have ex-
empted these type of cases because by nature they do not involve the ordi-
nary discovery route of other civil litigation; the facts to be be reviewed
already appear on an administrative record or the issues in controversy are
solely legal rather than factual. Our "banking cases" 12 are subject to both
the ISC procedure and to the separate expedited procedure outlined for
banking cases; together, these procedures complement each other. Those
cases that fail to proceed to default judgment or consent judgment through
the expedited banking case procedure because an answer contesting the
claim has been filed, undergo the initial scheduling procedure as a matter of
course.
B. Step Two: The Initial Scheduling Conference Call
Once the date for an ISC is selected, the case goes to the deputy clerk to
send notice of the setting and time for the conference. The attorneys are
mailed a prepared form of order known by our staff as the Initial Scheduling
Conference Call. 3 By this order the plaintiff, the defendant, and the court
are called together for the first time in order to have the attorneys apprise
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides for involuntary dismissal of an action for failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute. Rule 14(j) sets the 120-day time limit for service and mandates that, if
service of the summons and complaint is not made within that time and no good cause is
shown for the delay, the action should be dismissed without prejudice upon the court's own
initiative.
12. In the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, banking cases
consist of mortgage foreclosure actions and claims on promissory notes brought by United
States government agencies and federally insured loaning institutions. D.C.P.R. LOCAL R.
701.
13. The form for the Initial Scheduling Conference Call reads as follows:
Deeming it proper so to do, it is ADJUDGED and ORDERED that:
1. Unless already filed, answers to the complaint will be filed within ten (10) days
of this date. Any such filing will not be deemed a waiver of any prior motions.
2. Counsel will meet with the Court in chambers at on for
the purpose of informing the Court of their respective contentions and disclosing all
facts pertinent to the case, including bringing in the evidence to show such facts and
assessing any damages claimed. This conference will also serve the purposes of guid-
1986]
Catholic University Law Review
each other and their clients of the merits of their case. By meeting together
with the court at this early stage, the parties must set forth their facts and,
by so doing, confront the gaps in knowledge of their case. In addition, the
call orders the defendant to answer the complaint within ten days of the date
of the notice, without prejudice to or waiver of any prior motions, such as
motions to dismiss.
To make the meeting productive, the parties must prepare and come to
the conference with knowledge of the facts surrounding the pleadings and
their consequences, including assessment of damages. Therefore, the call re-
quires the parties to come ready and able to enter into agreements as to
uncontroverted facts and principles of law applicable to the case.14 In addi-
tion, counsel are required to be prepared to discuss settlement prospects.
The call reminds the attorneys of their duty under Rule 16(f) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.15
ing and setting discovery procedure and scheduling this case for Status Conference,
Pretrial and Trial.
3. All counsel should anticipate a trial date within ninety (90) days of this date
except in cases of protracted litigation. Once a trial date has been set with the con-
currence of counsel, no continuance will be granted except for good cause reasonably
shown. Trial will not be continued solely because counsel have agreed to recommend
a settlement. A trial date will be passed only if a settlement has been firmly bound so
that, if it is not consummated, summary judgment on the stipulation will be appro-
priate.
4. All counsel are admonished to expedite discovery. Interrogatories shall be
limited to no more than thirty (30) questions.
5. The objective of the conference scheduled herein is to simplify the issues and
to reach agreement as to uncontroverted facts and accepted principles of law applica-
ble to the case. Therefore, counsel attending are expected to be conversant enough
with the facts and the law to enter into such agreements. Counsel should be ready to
respond to such queries as the Court may deem appropriate, and be prepared to
discuss settlement prospects. As required by FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c), "[a]t least one of
the attorneys for each party participating in any conference before trial shall have
authority to enter into stipulations and to make admissions regarding all matters that
the participants may reasonably anticipate may be discussed." Counsel are reminded
that failure to participate in good faith, or participation while being substantially
unprepared, are noncompliant acts under FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) which may result in
sanctions, including the payment of reasonable expenses incurred by the noncompli-
ance.
Let the Clerk send copies of this Order to counsel of record and to pro se litigants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
14. See Rule 16(c), which reads in pertinent part as follows: "At least one of the attorneys
for each party participating in any conference before trial shall have authority to enter into
stipulations and to make admissions regarding all matters that the participants may reasonably
anticipate may be discussed." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) reads as follows:
(f) Sanctions. If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial
order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial
conference, or if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate
[Vol. 35:943
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The ISC call also informs the parties of the scheduling objectives of this
conference. Counsel are told to anticipate a trial date within ninety days of
the ISC except in cases requiring protracted litigation. 16 The call further
advises counsel that the trial date agreed upon at the ISC will be firm, and
no continuance will be granted unless a stipulation of settlement is firmly
bound.17 Expedited discovery is advised, and interrogatories are limited to
no more than thirty questions.
18
C. Step Three: The Initial Scheduling Conference
Upon the date set, the parties meet with me in chambers for the ISC. The
meeting is informal and takes the atmosphere of a t~te-A-t&e where informa-
tion, facts, and opinions are elicited from the parties candidly in order to
reach a consensus. The conference follows an established sequence in which
the parties first agree to facts, then state their positions of law, and finally
outline their discovery plans.
1. Nature of the Action
First, the parties and I hear the plaintiff's version of the story upon which
the action was brought. Then the defendant gives its version of the story and
defenses. The purpose of this introductory stage is for all of us to under-
stand how each side views its own case.
2. Agreement of Facts
This introduction sets the stage for me to direct the parties to the relevant
facts to which they can or should agree. By so agreeing, the parties avoid
the work associated with preparation of evidence on these particulars, and
they come to understand their evidence and their limits. Many times the
parties have come to realize there is no controversy as to the facts and then
have settled or submitted the case for the court's application of the law. If a
party comes without the knowledge required to either stipulate to a basic
in the conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to participate in good faith,
the judge, upon motion or his own initiative, may make such orders with regard
thereto as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B),
(C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall require the
party or the attorney representing him or both to pay the reasonable expenses in-
curred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless
the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other cir-
cumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
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fact or explain why it cannot be stipulated, the court includes the fact as
conditionally stipulated, that is, as true unless denied within a specified time.
During the Initial Scheduling Conference, the parties are encouraged to
identify the evidence or facts known by the other party that they would need
to know. I order the party with knowledge of or access to the information to
answer, to state, or to produce documents at a particular place and date.
Such arrangements speed the proceedings and avoid a great deal of cost by
preventing later conflicts on the matter.
3. Controverted Facts and Legal Issues
The next stage of the ISC follows naturally from the first. The parties
identify for the record the relevant facts and legal issues in controversy.
These controverted facts and issues may include jurisdictional questions as
well as disputes on the merits. If a particular jurisdictional challenge ap-
pears likely to succeed, I may direct the planning of the discovery schedule
to allow first for a decision on jurisdiction.
4. Discovery
The third stage of the conference requires the parties to outline their plans
for discovery and to enter into an agreement that the discovery so outlined
constitutes the only discovery required in the case. The plan for discovery,
of course, is subject to variation according to the nature of the case itself.
Usually, I set limits on the number of days for serving interrogatories, spec-
ify the time and place for taking depositions, and outline the conditions to be
imposed, such as who is going to produce which witness and at whose ex-
pense. In addition, I may request the parties to state in writing by a certain
date the names, addresses, and employment of their witnesses, with a short
statement as to the subject matter of their testimony. My judicial determina-
tion of these matters saves a lot of time that often is incurred in extrajudicial
determinations of dates and payment of expenses, matters which, if unsettled
by counsel, become the subject of court motions and, possibly, hearings.
The parties are advised that if noncompliance with the order of the court
causes any problems with discovery, the party harmed by the noncompliance
should inform me as soon as it is evident that counsel cannot resolve the
dispute themselves. I then sanction the noncompliant party in a manner
commensurate with the issue raised by the noncompliance.' 9
After the discovery plans have been established, I set a discovery deadline
that is at least one month prior to the trial. By this deadline, all interrogato-
ries and requests for admissions must be answered and all depositions and
19. See infra text accompanying notes 22-23 for a discussion of sanctions.
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examination taken. This means that interrogatories and requests for admis-
sions must be served at least thirty days prior to the deadline. On occasion,
when the parties agree, depositions not scheduled during the ISC may be
taken if notice is given a reasonable time before the deadline and on the
condition that those depositions do not result in the continuance of the trial
date.
5. Schedule with the Court
The final stage of the ISC involves setting a schedule for further confer-
ences and trial that fits into all parties' schedules. If settlement appears to be
likely after some discovery has been had, or if the case is a complex one
requiring close court monitoring, I set a status conference at a date timed to
complement the completion of certain discovery. I then set a pretrial confer-
ence, at which the principals are ordered to be available by telephone, and a
date for trial.
D. Step Four: The Initial Scheduling Order
Pursuant to the agreements and statements of the parties and the court
orders given orally in the ISC, I prepare a written order, similar to the min-
utes of a meeting, recording the pertinent matters in an established sequence.
The order begins with a brief introduction that covers the general nature of
the case, the allegations of the parties, and the status of the case. Secondly, I
include each relevant fact to which the parties have agreed. The plan for
discovery that we agreed upon and dates for further conferences and trial
also form part of the order. The order also contains a deadline for joinder of
parties and amendment of pleadings. At the end of the order, I add admoni-
tions regarding imposition of sanctions in the event of noncompliance and
the requirement of a showing of good cause for changing any of the dates set
by the order. This written order is sent to the parties within a week of the
ISC.20
20. A form of this order follows:
Initial Scheduling Order:
The parties met with the Court on pursuant to an
Initial Scheduling Conference, represented by their respective attorneys:
for plaintiff(s); and
for defendant(s).
(Summary of the case):
I. Agreement of the Parties:
(if applicable: "If not denied within 10 days, the statement of
will stand as true.")
II. Controverted Facts and Issues:
A. Controverted Facts:
1986]
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E. Step Five. Following Up the Initial Scheduling Order
Effective follow-up of the Initial Scheduling Conference and order is criti-
cal to the success of the system. The key to this follow-up is a system of
sanctions for noncompliance embedded in the ISC itself. During the ISC,
when ordering a party to produce certain information or to submit a brief, I
also may order a particular consequence or sanction for noncompliance.
Depending on the nature of the ordered action, a sanction may be either
automatically triggered or made effective upon the request and appropriate
showing by the opposing party. In addition, as noted previously, the order
issued after the ISC advises the parties that noncompliance with any order
therein may result in the imposition of sanctions on the noncomplying party,
attorney, or both.2 '
The conditional stipulation is an illustration of an automatically triggered
consequence.22 For example, in a diversity case for wrongful discharge and
violation of right to privacy for opening an employee's personally addressed
package, the defendant employer entered into a conditional stipulation re-
B. Legal Questions:
III. Discovery:
The parties have agreed that they are going to have only the following
discovery: (Scheduling of depositions, interrogatories, examinations, etc.).
All discovery must be completed by . By this
deadline, all interrogatories and requests for admissions must be answered
and all depositions and examinations taken. This means that interrogatories
and requests for admissions must be served at least 30 days prior to the dead-
line and notice of depositions given within a reasonable time of the deadline.
Parties will state in writing the names, addresses, and employment of their
witnesses, with a short statement as to the subject matter of their testimony,
on or before . (Or: the names of the witnesses to
be called by the parties are the following: .. .
IV. Schedule with the Court:
A. Status Conference at
B. Pretrial at
The parties are ORDERED to have their principals available by phone dur-
ing the Pretrial Conference under penalty of fine.
C. Trial at 9:30 a.m.
V. Any motions for joinder of parties or for amendment for pleadings must be
filed on or before . Noncompliance with any
order herein may result in the imposition of sanctions on the noncomplying
party, attorney, or both, which may include the imposition of a fine.
The dates specified herein shall not be changed unless parties agree in writ-
ing to do so and such change does not affect the subsequent course of the
action as scheduled herein or the Court grants leave for good cause, ade-
quately shown.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
21. See also infra text accompanying notes 22-23.
22. See supra part I(C)(2).
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garding relevant rules of company procedure. The Court ordered, along
with the stipulation, that if not denied within fifteen days, the facts of the
stipulation would be taken as true. Thus, the matter was solely in the pos-
session of the defendant, and the stipulation, once in effect, served to avoid
prolonged production of documents and to narrow the evidence for trial.
Another type of order requires a party to produce clearly specified infor-
mation or documents by a certain time. This type of order is useful in re-
quiring a party to support its contention that a certain fact is in dispute. For
example, in a case where the plaintiff alleged that he had been adjudged
mentally incapacitated by state and federal administrative agencies, I or-
dered: "Plaintiff is to file with the Court, with a copy to the other parties, all
such certificates adjudging plaintiff's mental incapacity and sworn state-
ments by doctors on or before [specified date]. The defendant, if not satis-
fied, will state their position on or before [specified date, two weeks later]."
An appropriate sanction for not producing the information requested would
be to take as true the relevant factual theory espoused by the opponent.
Whether this sanction is triggered can depend upon the opposing attorney's
report, as in the example above, or can be fashioned to occur automatically
upon noncompliance and failure to notify the court.
I use a similar type of embedded sanction in orders to submit briefs on
contested legal issues. For example, in a suit in which the plaintiff alleged
punitive damages for discharge from public employment, I ordered the
plaintiff to file a brief, on or before a specified date, covering his right to
punitive damages. The defendant was ordered to answer on or before a date
set one month later. The sanctions for noncompliance with this order could
have been, for the plaintiff, the dismissal of that particular claim and, for the
defendant, the presentation of that claim before the jury.
Similarly, I have ordered plaintiffs to itemize their damage allegations. If
the plaintiff fails to submit the itemizations as required, the dismissal of par-
ticular elements of damages results. Along the same line, I may disallow
witnesses when a party fails to comply by a certain date with my order to
submit the names, addresses, and employment of its witnesses, with a sum-
mary of the nature of their testimony. This type of order has proved ex-
tremely useful in directing discovery and preparing for trial. Another
technique, used most often in commercial or complex cases, consists of re-
quiring the parties to meet and stipulate further to specified quantifiable in-
formation. For example, in a state law claim for damages for termination of
a franchise relationship, I ordered the parties to stipulate and submit by a
specified date the exact figures for commissions and annual premiums used
to compute damages under a state law formula. Such an order both obviates
1986]
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the need for submitting this matter to formal discovery and provides the
parties with an opportunity to see the amount of damages in perspective and
thus consider settlement as a practical alternative. Since this type of order is
to each party's benefit, the appropriate sanctions for noncompliance are de-
veloped on an ad hoc basis as attorneys report the circumstances of noncom-
pliance to the court.
Some situations arise in which sanctions of necessity must be imposed ad
hoc and in a manner not directly related to the matter over which noncom-
pliance resulted. For example, in an action brought by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for monies owed on promissory notes signed
by a husband only, the FDIC failed to file a brief as ordered on whether the
wife and the conjugal partnership were liable for the unpaid note under the
state's community property law. To sanction this noncompliance by ac-
cepting as true the defense position of nonliability would have left the FDIC
without recourse on an overdue note, which, even from the defendants' brief,
appeared to have benefitted the conjugal partnership, thus rendering the
partnership liable. In such situations, I prefer monetary sanctions, such as
fines, to sanctions that distort the truth of the matter by striking pleadings or
defenses or by presuming facts as to the matter under discovery.
In the area of monetary sanctions, I prefer to assess fines payable to the
court rather than to require the noncomplying party to reimburse the other
for expenses and fees incurred by the sanctionable conduct. In my opinion,
fines serve several purposes that compensation to the other party does not.
Not only do fines punish present misconduct, they also deter future miscon-
duct. Both of these are primary goals of imposing sanctions. In addition,
assessing fines eliminates satellite litigation as to the amount of attorneys'
fees to be imposed, a collateral proceeding that defeats the goal of efficiency
sought to be achieved through the ISC method. Finally, I have found that,
in many instances, a fine imposed directly on the attorney rather than on the
client is an appropriate sanction when the attorney rather than the client has
caused the noncompliance.23
II. A PROPOSAL FOR REVISING THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1983,
contains the rudimentary framework from which the Initial Scheduling Con-
23. I have found little precedent directly on point regarding the imposition of fines on
attorneys. Nevertheless, the practice is well within the spirit of the federal rules. See, e.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (imposition of fine on attorney, client, or both for signing in violation of the
rule), and the recent approach to sanctions taken by the Supreme Court. E.g., Roadway Ex-
press, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980) (dictum).
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ference system can be developed as a mandatory tool of judicial manage-
ment.24 The intention behind the rule, according to the advisory committee,
was "to encourage forceful judicial management."25 In my opinion, the ISC
system effectively and efficiently serves the goals which the present Rule 16
espouses but, as yet, only partially implements through a system of pretrial
procedure.
Rule 16(a) enumerates various purposes of pretrial conferences, namely:
"(1) expediting the disposition of the action; (2) establishing early and con-
tinuing control so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of
management; (3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; (4) improving the
quality of the trial through more thorough preparation, and; (5) facilitating
the settlement of the case.", 26 My experience is that the ISC serves all these
purposes. For example, on many occasions, the parties realize that there are
no differences of fact or law between them, and they consequently settle the
case. In most instances, the parties become aware of the totality of relevant
facts in the case as a whole for the first time. They then become more effec-
tive in searching for truth and finding a solution that leads to an early settle-
ment of the case. The remaining cases that do not settle are tried promptly
and with full knowledge of the parties' facts and allegations.
Under present Rule 16(b) and (c), within 120 days from the filing of the
complaint, the court must issue a scheduling order that fixes deadlines for
joinder of parties, amending pleadings, filing and hearing pretrial motions,
and completion of discovery. The rule provides that the order may be en-
tered by means of a conference, a telephone call, or mail. The order may,
but need not, include the dates for further pretrial conferences and trial and
the subjects of fact and law and discovery planning enumerated in Rule
16(c).2 7
By going only halfway, the rule presents as many problems as it solves.
How can attorneys and the court agree on a deadline for completing discov-
ery or adding parties or claims, without knowing which underlying facts are
in dispute? How can deadlines for pretrial motions be set without discussing
the applicable law? If the facts and law are essential to the schedule man-
dated in the rule, why not require them to be discussed, formulated, and
simplified to the maximum extent possible? And finally, how can such tasks
be achieved effectively and efficiently by letter or even in a telephone confer-
ence call? The advisory committee noted that "there is no reason why some
of the procedural matters listed in Rule 16(c) cannot be addressed at the
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
25. Id. Rule 16(f) advisory committee note.
26. FED. R. Ov. P. 16(a).
27. Id. Rule 16(c).
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same time [as the scheduling matters in subdivision (b)], at least when a
scheduling conference is held."2 I submit that there is every reason why
these matters should be addressed in a mandatory conference that incorpo-
rates the scheduling concerns of subdivision (b) with the procedural and sub-
stantive matters of subdivision (c), thus streamlining a process that
otherwise is piecemeal and undirected.
In essence, my proposal is to consolidate subdivisions (b) and (c) of Rule
16 into one rule mandating that a scheduling conference be held within 120
days of the filing of the complaint in order to set the enumerated subdivision
(b) deadlines and to take action on the subdivisions (c)(1), (c)(3), and (c)(5)
matters. The new rule I envision would also require the court to consider, as
appropriate, the matters outlined in subdivisions (c)(2), (c)(4), and (c)(6)
through (c)(1 1).
In addition, this new rule would incorporate the concept of the discovery
conference presently required by Rule 26(f) when an attorney moves the
court to do so pursuant to that rule.29 Rule 26(f) further requires a court,
following such a discovery conference, to enter an order "tentatively identi-
fying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and schedule for
discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any; and determining such
other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary for the
proper management of discovery in the action."3 As devised, my ISC order
deals with this problem at the outset of the litigation, thus minimizing costly,
time-consuming discovery fights. Under my proposed rule, the matters that
are presently required to be discussed only upon motion of an attorney
would become mandatory subjects of the ISC even absent a motion.
Objections to this proposal may arise from concerns that all these matters
cannot be discussed and decided so early in the litigation. My experience at
the bar and on the bench has been otherwise. By the time a complaint is
filed, a plaintiff should know the case quite well; in fact, such knowledge is
now required of counsel under Rule 11.31 In many instances, the defendant
has already engaged in prelitigation discussion with the plaintiff and is ac-
quainted with some of the facts of the case. Even where this is not so, the
ISC system as devised, gives the defendant sufficient time for a reasonable
inquiry into the facts: there are twenty days to answer plus a fifteen-day
extension, if granted, and then at least fifteen to twenty-five days thereafter
before the ISC takes place. Furthermore, to be able to deal effectively with
this new method of judicial management, the natural reluctance of lawyers
28. Id. Rule 16(b) advisory committee note.
29. Id. Rule 26(f).
30. Id.
3 1. Id. Rule 11.
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to engage in fruitful discussion with their opposition must be pierced.
Throughout the years, lawyers rather than the courts have directed the
course of cases through motions for continuance of conference or trial, mo-
tions for extension of time to file, and motions interposed for delay or harass-
ment. To regain control of pretrial litigation, the courts must take the
offensive in setting the pace.
All this does not mean that the new pace of litigation will run roughshod
over the rights of litigants. The ISC rule I propose should include a proviso
allowing the court to issue an abbreviated ISC order that states reasons for
its brevity and the need to set an additional ISC at a later date. This proviso
would ensure that the first ISC is held as scheduled, that the court has in-
deed asserted its role early in the case, and that further ISCs would complete
the task more effectively and carefully in a case involving numerous parties
or issues. The present Rule 16 already envisions the possibility of a series of
multiple conferences.32
A second criticism of this proposed ISC rule is that it may cause over-
administration of cases that simply do not merit such close judicial attention.
I have not found this concern to be of practical import. First, as the advi-
sory committee suggests, I exempt certain categories of cases from this sys-
tem.33 These categories include social security and bankruptcy appeals,
miscellaneous cases, and habeas corpus petitions. Second, I have found that
cases that do not need this type of judicial administration either terminate by
consent or dismissal prior to the ISC date, or are resolved during the initial
stages of the ISC itself. In other words, the ISC system has proved to be a
useful mechanism in encouraging the early termination of cases that do not
merit further attention.
Finally, I highly agree with the spirit of the 1983 amendment that added
subdivision (f) on sanctions to Rule 16.34 Only by reinforcing the concept of
sanctions will lawyers maintain strict compliance with the schedule and
court orders prepared in the ISC. As presently written, Rule 16(f) appears
to require the judge to order the noncompliant party or attorney, or both, to
pay the reasonable expenses incurred by noncompliance. I believe that this
apparent limitation on the courts' power to impose fines is neither intended
nor desirable. First, the rule provides for not ordering sanctions where "the
judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other
32. Id. Rule 16(e) advisory committee note ("Since the amended rule encourages more
extensive pretrial management than did the original, two or more conferences may be held in
many cases.").
33. Id. Rule 16(b) advisory committee note.
34. For text of FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f), see supra note 15.
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circumstances make an award of expenses unjust."3 Furthermore, in its
discussion of this section, the advisory committee noted that "the Court has
discretion to impose whichever sanction it feels is appropriate under the cir-
cumstances.",36 Thus, I believe the court has power to exercise its discretion
and should do so more frequently through fines payable to the court rather
than through compensation to the opponent, an approach that necessitates a
good deal of satellite litigation. 37 I propose that Rule 16(f) reflect the availa-
bility of sanctions in the form of fines deposited with the clerk of the court,
to be set in an amount appropriate to the conduct being sanctioned. At
present, Rule 16(f) specifically incorporates the sanctions provided in Rule
37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D), provisions that list foremost the most severe sanctions
and those that distort the truth of the matter. It would be preferable in my
opinion to emphasize the effectiveness and desirability of various monetary
sanctions instead.
III. CONCLUSION
Proper pretrial method can have a two-fold result. Either settlement is
reached or trial is expedited because the parties have learned all the material
facts early in the proceedings and have economized the time used for discov-
ery. This method is attractive not only because it may eliminate trial; it also
may eliminate much of the standard discovery and its costly manipulations.
The ICS method, which elicits the true facts of a case rather than the
hearsay upon which pleadings are framed, does not destroy the rights of the
parties to have the contested facts and issues litigated and resolved. On the
contrary, the method preserves our constitutional system of separation of
powers by enabling the judge to apply the law to discovered facts rather than
to a set of facts which may not exist. The job of the judge, and indeed of our
adversarial system in general, is to help the parties develop and clarify the
facts through the crucible of question and answer, discussion and challenge,
and through contradictory facts presented by the other parties. Then and
only then can judges learn the true facts that will prevail in court. By this
method, courts look at the facts in an objective, holistic manner, without the
distortion, harassment, and adversarial selection of only those facts advanta-
geous to one side.
We, the judges, must take control of pretrial procedure, learn the facts of
our cases, and settle them equitably and economically. Forceful judicial
management of cases can contribute to more efficient, more economical, and
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
36. Id. Rule 16(f) advisory committee note.
37. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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more effective litigation. However, the judicial system still needs legal pio-
neers to test and perfect the application of the ICS system through experi-
ence and shared reflection. It is to this end that I have written. I hope these
suggestions will aid all trial courts in their continuing progress on the first
line of fire.

